SCARY MONSTERS:
HEGEL AND THE NATURE OF THE MONSTROUS

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Scary Monsters, Super Freaks
Keep me running, Running Scared
—David Bowie

Monsters share more than the word’s root with the verb “to demonstrate”; monsters signify.
—Donna Haraway

What are monsters? What defines their morphology? How does a monster come to show itself as a monster? How does it demonstrate (montre) its monstrous nature? Where does this demonstration take place? And what is its significance? Of what are monsters the sign? In short, what is the nature of the monstrous and what makes them scary?

The following will inquire after the significance of monstrosity. This investigation will be situated in a text of modern philosophy that addresses and gives particular place to the monstrous, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. As Hegel indicates in the introduction to this text:

Everywhere nature mixes up the essential limits through intermediate and inferior formations that always provide instances opposed to every firm distinction. Even within determinate genera (i.e., the human genus) monsters arise that must on the one hand be included in this genus, but on the other hand lack the determinations that were seen as the essential property of the genus (Hegel 1986a, §250a).

The monstrous is two faced; it presents a double topology. A monster is included within a given form and, at the same time, exceeds the determinations that are proper to that form. Therefore, “if one can speak of a dialectic of forms, it is evident that it is essential to take into account deviations for which nature—even if they are most often determined to be against nature—is incontestably responsible” (Bataille 1985, p. 55). The Philosophy of Nature, the second main division of Hegelian philosophy, will give place to and demonstrate deviations from the rationality of the concept. These deviations are anticipated as being indifferent to the movement of the concept and are therefore relegated to an external, contingent position. “It is most impertinent to demand of the concept that it should comprehend and, as it is said, construe or deduce such contin-
gencies [Zufälligkeiten] ... Traces of the conceptual determination will
certainly survive in the most particularized product [das Partikuläriste],
but they will not exhaust it” (Hegel 1986a, §250a). In other words, aber-
rations must be expected as part of the richness of nature and can usually
be accounted for as mere contingencies that do not either deform the
structure of the science or resist the movement of reason itself.

But what if nature was also beset by another kind of monstrosity, one
which does not remain indifferent to reason but resists the concept alto-
gether? What if nature was also afflicted with a radically contingency that
not only exceeds but impedes the very movement of reason itself? Such
a superlative deformation would no longer be able to be accounted for as
a mere particular deviation and acquitted as a natural contingency. For
such monsters would contaminate the very form and functioning of rea-
son itself. They would deform the very structure of the system in general.
And in this way, they would not only escape all possible conceptualizations
but in doing so would exceed the science altogether, opening Hegelian
philosophy to an exotic and frightening wilderness beyond the very limits
of its control and comprehension.

This inquiry into the nature of the monstrous will permit itself to be
corrupted by another discourse authored by one of the greatest monsters
of the modern epoch, namely, the 120 Days of Sodom by D. A. F. de Sade.
The incorporation of this other textuality that seems to be absolutely
foreign to Hegelian philosophy will appear to be nothing less than a
monstrous distortion of what is considered to be proper philosophical
discourse. This operation is, of course, deliberate and necessary.

Introduction

1. The Method

In order to be able to consider these [monstrous] formations as deficient,
inferior and deformed, a fixed type [Typus] will be presupposed, be-
cause this also supplies each so-called monster, deformation, mixture,
etc. This, however, cannot be created from experience, rather it presup-
poses the independence and worth of the determinate concept (Hegel
1986a, §250a).

A monster shows itself as a monster only insofar as it supervenes
through the deformation of a determined form. Therefore, it is necessary
to articulate some sort of formal structure as the tissue from which and
within which monstrous deformations arise and become manifest. Ac-
cording to Hegel, this formal structure or fixed type cannot be created
from experience. Rather it “presupposes the independence and worth of
the determinate concept.” In the case of philosophy, the concept cannot
be provided by some sort of external reflection or universal representa-
tion. On the contrary, it can only be established through the presentation of the concept in and for itself. This is, of course, achieved in the Logic which is considered to be the only, truly systematic articulation of the science.

The Science of Logic concludes with the “Absolute Idea” which “is the sole object and content of philosophy” (Hegel 1986c, p. 549). Since the determination of the Absolute Idea and the entire course followed by this determination constitutes the content of the Logic (or as the note appended to Encyclopaedia §237 indicates: “The content of the absolute idea is the whole breadth of ground which has passed under our view up to this point”), what remains to be considered in the final moment is not a content as such but its universal form, that is, its method. The method is not a specific kind or manner peculiar to some cognition. Rather, it is the sole force of reason, the movement of rational thought, the activity of the concept itself. And because the concept is everything its movement is the universal absolute activity, the self-determining and self-realizing movement (Hegel 1986c, p. 551). “Thus what constitutes the method are the determinations of the concept itself and their relations, which now have to be considered in their significance as determinations of the method” (p. 553).

This final section begins with the beginning and in doing so returns to the initial moments of the Logic itself. The beginning, at the beginning, is an abstract universal which is simple, immediate, and indeterminate. As such, the beginning is “merely the abstract relation to self” (p. 554). This immediacy can also “be expressed as the in-itself that is without a being-for-self” (p. 555); that is, for example, a being in-itself that is not yet posited as being for-itself. The means of advance, which constitutes not only the mediation of the beginning but the process of determination in general, is not a mere subjective operation imposed by consciousness but an objective operation of being itself. “Hence, the immediacy of the beginning must be in its own self deficient and endowed with the urge to carry itself further” (p. 555). For this reason, the advance is not a kind of superfluity. Rather, “the beginning contains as such within itself the beginning of the advance and development” (p. 556). This Ordeal, “by which the universal of the beginning of its own accord determines itself as the other of itself, is to be named the dialectical moment” (p. 557). This moment, which is also called the “second term,” has come into being as the negative of the beginning or first term, “and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative.” “Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate is now mediated, related to an other” (p. 561).

Although the second term may be taken as a simple determination, it is otherwise.
In its truth it [the second term] is a relation or relationship; for it is the negative, but the negative of the positive, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent—in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship—rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself (p. 562).

Strictly speaking, the second term is a relation or relationship that takes the form of a contradiction. In this contradiction, however, the terms are not held asunder as they are in ordinary thinking but are themselves to be thought. Hence, the negativity of the second term is itself negated. This “second negative,” which is in fact the negative of the negative, is the “sublation of the contradiction” (p. 563) and, as such, constitutes not only the turning point of the movement of the concept but the “innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self-movement” (p. 563). It may be prudent here to recollect the meaning of sublate as it was first determined in the Doctrine of Being.

To sublate and the sublated constitute one of the most important concepts in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination that repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy. ... To sublate has a twofold meaning in language; on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. ... Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated (Hegel 1986b, pp. 113-14).

The second negation which is a sublation of the dialectical moment constitutes the turning point. “In this turning point of the method, the course of cognition at the same time returns into itself. As self-sublating contradiction this negativity is the restoration of the first immediacy ...” (Hegel 1986c, p. 564). This second immediacy can be considered the third term. In this way, the whole form of the method consists in a triplcity. However, insofar as the second term, the dialectical moment, consists in a duality (a negation and a negation of negation), “the third can also be reckoned as fourth, and instead of a triplcity, the abstract form may be taken as a quadruplicity” (p. 564). Although the form of the method can number either three or four, the Logic adopts the tripartite enumeration. This adoption is not only evident in the numbering of the various divisions of the Logic, an enumeration that the Introduction reminds us can be only provisional, but is also manifest in the remaining paragraphs of the Absolute Idea in which the final moment is continually named the “third.” This triplcity, corresponds to and confirms in terms of the concept itself the numerical form presented by the logical syllogism. And it this trinary form that is represented in the introduction to the *Encyclopedi" of the Philosophical Sciences.*
The idea turns out to be the thought that is completely identical with itself and that, as such, is the activity of setting itself over against itself in order to be for itself and to be merely with itself [bei sich selbst] in this other. Thus philosophy is divided into three parts:

I. Logic: the Science of the idea in and for itself,
II. The Philosophy of Nature: the Science of the idea in its otherness,
III. The Philosophy of Spirit: that of the idea that returns to itself from out of its otherness (Hegel 1986a, §18).

Here, however, the numerical representation of the structure of philosophy, although corresponding to that resulting in the course of the Science of Logic, only has the status of an anticipation of the idea and is not a result of the absolute idea in and for itself.

The third moment, then, constitutes a return to the immediacy of the first. “Hence it is now itself the same thing as the beginning had determined itself to be. As simple self-relation it is a universal, and in this universality the negativity that constituted the dialectic and mediation has likewise gone together into simple determinateness which again can be a beginning” (Hegel 1986c, p. 566). This return, however, is not an infinite repetition. Rather, it is a return where the immediate beginning in-itself has been rendered for-itself and, in doing so, constitutes a new beginning. “As this beginning is distinguished from its predecessor precisely by that determinateness, cognition rolls on wards from content to content” (p. 569). Hence, the method is the sole force and movement of reason in its totality; all content is submitted to it for all content is in and by it. “So far as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole logic consists of such” (p. 561).

The general contours and consequences of this method for the science can be summarized by the following:

By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back to the beginning (the simple ground) through the mediation; this circle is moreover a circle of circles, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of new member. Links of this chain are the individual sciences, each of which has an antecedent and a successor—or, expressed more accurately, has only the antecedent and indicates its successor in its conclusion (p. 571).

Due to the method, the science presents itself as a presuppositionless, auto-affective, self-sufficient economy that has the form of a circle of circles. Each circle is animated by the method. It therefore passes through a tripartite process in which each individual member is both determined in and for itself and constitutes the beginning of a new member. The principle mechanisms of this process are two negations. All difference
comprises a self-negation whereby the posited other is always the other of another. And this differentiation is always surpassed through a negation of negation or sublation of the initial contradiction. According to these determinations, there can be no differentiated alterity other than that which is self-differentiating. This is made explicit in the Zusatz to the first section of the Philosophy of Spirit: “An out-and-out other does not at all exist for spirit” (Hegel 1986a, §37). Conversely, there can be nothing left behind, on the outside (as it were), by the second negation. “By its dialectical advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind, but carries along with it all it has gained…” (Hegel 1986c, p. 569).

2. Monstrosity: Exorbitance and Waste

At the end of the Logic the science is grasped in its totality as a circle of circles. This system produces itself through a tripartite process animated by two negations. The monstrous deformations of this system will become manifest as monstrous insofar as they demonstrate a general deformation of this process. The following, therefore, will consider two deformities: exorbitance and waste. These two deviations will supervene as deformations of the two negative moments of the method. Hence, exorbitant difference will come forth as a deformation of the first negation and waste will supervene as an aberration of the second. Here the demonstrations of the Marquis de Sade will provide a most helpful anticipation.

And catching up the syringe, he fills it with milk, returns to behind his object, brandishes the nozzle, plunges it into the vent, and shoots out the fluid. Having been told what to expect, Eugénie submits to everything; no sooner is the remedy in her entrails then he lies down on the bed and orders Eugénie to come at once and straddle him. “Now,” he says, “if you’ve got anything to do, have the kindness to do it in my mouth.” The timid creature has taken her place as she has been told to do, she pushes, the libertine strokes himself, his mouth, sealed hermetically to her asshole, catches every drop of the precious liquid that leaps out of it. He swallows it all... [Then], brutally casting the little girl far from him once he has done, the saintly man readjusts his cleric’s garb, says that he has been cheated, deceived, for this child, he swears, had not priorly shitted, no, they’d lied, she’d come to him full of shit, and he’d swallow half her turd, fe upon them. It is to be noted that Monsieur l’Abbé wanted milk only, not shit (Sade 1966, 10.1).

The exorbitant supervenes as an alterity that remains absolutely in excess of an other that is posited for-itself. It is a differential that had not been deployed through the ordeal of self-differentiation and, for that reason, will not have been sublated into the third and final moment. Therefore, the exorbitant cannot be indicated, made manifest, or brought
to speech within the space of the scientific process that it absolutely exceeds. Rather, it becomes presented within that space only through the manifestation of a disparity between that which was posited in difference and that which is sublated. The exorbitant, therefore, becomes manifest through the sudden and unexpected presentation of a radical alterity that was not posited through the self-negation of the beginning. It comes forth as a kind of surprise.

Waste constitutes a deformation of the negation of negation or the sublation of the dialectical moment.

Yet another had, if that is possible, a still more bizarre eccentricity; he liked to find four turds in the pot beneath a pierced chair. . . . He would be shut up alone in the room containing this treasure, never did he allow a girl with him, and every precaution had to be taken to ensure his solitude, he could not bear the thought he might be observed, and when at last he felt secure he went into action; but I am absolutely unable to tell you what he did, for no one had ever seen him; all that is known is that when he had left the room, the pot was discovered perfectly empty and as tidy as can be. But what he did with his four turds only the devil can tell you, if indeed he knows. He may have thrown them away somewhere . . . (Sade 1966, 11.5).

Waste indicates an alterity that is not sublated and as such is either lost or left behind. Philosophy will not be able to indicate that which exceeds sublation, for to do so would be to sublate it. Therefore, waste is always passed over in silence, and supervenes only insofar as it remains absent from the third and final moment of the process. Waste, then, becomes manifest through its wasting, its absenta or surreptitious withdrawal. It show itself only through the trace of its effacement.

The “demonstration” of these monstrosities will be pursued in the final sections of the Philosophy of Nature. As such, the inquiry will be situated in the “Animal Organism.”

As living universality, the animal organism is the concept, which passes syllogistically through its three determinations. Each syllogism is in itself the same totality of substantial unity, and in keeping with the determination of its form, is at the same time the transition into the others. The extent totality of the animal is therefore the result of this process (Hegel 1986a, §352).

The animal organism is the concept that determines itself through a tripartite process. In accordance with the method, each moment of this process is itself the same process and, at the same time, the transition into its other. The animal organism is only insofar as it turns itself into what it is. The three processes of this self-determination are anticipated as follows:

The organism is to be considered a) as the individual Idea, which in its process is simply self-related, and which inwardly joins itself together
with itself, i.e., shape; b) as Idea which relates itself to its other, its inorganic nature, and posits the ideal nature of this other within itself, i.e. assimilation; c) as the Idea relating to an other which is itself a living individual, and thereby relating itself to itself in the other, i.e., the Gattungsprozeß [Genus-process] (§352).

The examination will be divided into three main parts. First, it will concern waste in the assimilation process of the animal. It will then take up the question of the exorbitant in both female genitalia and in nature herself. Finally, it will examine the wasting of the Philosophy of Nature as a whole. Such wasting will be accompanied by fire, whose appearance here will necessitate a regress to the physical elements, to the "element" as such.

Then, with the other hand, I placed a small fire shovel, heated red-hot for this purpose, under his balls. This rubbing with the one hand, the consuming heat which rose to bake his testicles, perhaps a little touching of my two buttocks, which I had to keep well exposed and in reach during the operation, this combination of elements melted him altogether and he discharged, being very careful to spill his seed upon the hot shovel where, to his unutterable delight, he watched it sizzle and evaporate in vapor (Sade 1966, 26.2).

Monstrosities

1. Waste I—Excrement

Assimilation constitutes the second moment of the animal organism. The first is comprised of shape [Gestalt]. Therefore, before undertaking a particular examination of assimilation, we will first consider the process of the animal's formation.

In that it is living, shape is essentially a process. As such it is indeed abstract, and is the process of formation [Gestaltung] within itself, in which the organism makes its own members into its inorganic nature, or into means, consuming itself and producing itself as this totality of members. In this way, each member is interchangeably end and means, and maintains itself from the others and in opposition to them (Hegel 1986a, §356).

Shape, insofar as it is alive, is in process. "The living is and preserves itself only as this reproduction and not as an entity [Seiendes]" (§352). Shape is not tranquil [ruhig] being but rather a restlessness of formation [Gestaltung als Unruhe] (§356z). In this way, the organism lives and maintains itself by feeding off itself. It turns itself into its inorganic other and reproduces itself by consuming this alterity. Therefore, each member of the organism is a means and an end. It is a means insofar as it is consumed, and it is an end insofar as it is reproduced through this consumption. Formally, the animal organism is autotrophic.
Assimilation is the second process of animal life. It consists of three moments: 1) the self-feeling [Selbstgefühl] of the organism, 2) the positing of itself as other, and 3) the identifying itself with itself in its other. "The organism must therefore posit the external as subjective, and first make it its own, identifying itself with it, and this is assimilation" (§357a). The assimilation process, then, will also be manifest as a kind of autotomy.

The first moment of assimilation is accomplished in the self-feeling of shape [Gestalt], which is the direct result of the Gestaltungsprozeß. The second moment begins with the expulsion of an other from this self-related enclosure. "The self-feeling of individuality is, however, likewise immediately exclusive and tenses itself in opposition to an inorganic nature that is opposed as its external conditions and material" (§357). The other that stands over and against the individual organism is not something alien but rather only that alterity that was discharged by the organism itself.

It must also release [entlassen] the other, which is a moment within the organism, into the abstraction of an immediately present outer-world, with which it enters into relationship. The standpoint of life is precisely this ordeal, the projection of the sun and all things from out of itself (§357a).

Such expulsion is an unconscious creativity [das bewußtlose Schöpfersche]. It is the primary division or ordeal of organic life.

The third and final moment of the assimilation process is produced through the sublation of externality. Such sublation takes two forms, theoretical and practical. The theoretical process immediately follows the positing of difference.

In this external relation, the animal organism is immediately reflected in itself and is the ideal relationship of the theoretical process, sensibility as an external process, and indeed as determinate feeling, which differentiates itself into the multifarious sensuousness of inorganic nature (§357).

In the theoretical process, the positing of alterity immediately coincides with its return. In sensation, the other is posited as other and at the same time is a determination of the animal’s feeling. "That that is hard and warm, etc. is independent and external, but it is to an equal extent immediately transformed and given an ideal nature as a determinateness of my feeling" (§357a).

The second type of relation is practical.

The real process or the practical relationship with inorganic nature, begins with the diremption of the self in itself, the feeling of externality as the negation of the subject, which is, at the same time, the positive self-relation and therein the self-certainty which is opposed against this negation of itself. In other words, the process begins with the feeling of
deficiency and the drive to overcome it. The condition of this appears to be a stimulation from the outside and one that posits the negation of the subject in the manner of an object against which it is tensed (§359).

The practical process arises from self-bifurcation. This division results in a feeling of loss or a deficiency that, although originating with the organism in itself, initially appears as a stimulation from the outside. Therefore, the division of the organism in itself appears to the organism as an external object standing opposed to its subjectivity. The third moment will be a reification of this subject with its external object. It will consist in the sublution of this difference.

The third moment of the practical process commences with mechanical seizure [mechanische Bemächtigung] and is finally accomplished by transformation [Verwandlung]. Transformation is further divided into the simple and the complex.

Assimilation is the immediate fusion of animality with that which is taken up into it. Whatever is taken up is infected with animality, and a simple transformation occurs. Secondly, assimilation is the mediation of digestion—that is, the opposition of the subject against the external and is further differentiated as the process of animal water [animalischen Wassers] (the gastric and pancreatic juice and animal lymph in general) and the animal fire [animalischen Feuers] (the bile) (§364).

Practical difference initially appears as an object that is set in opposition to a subject and that is to be surpassed through mechanical seizure and transformation. However, this entire engagement itself is only an appearance. The proper difference posited by the organism is not that of an external object but rather the engagement with the appearance of such externalities. Therefore, it is in turning from this appearance of an external object to the externality of the engagement with such appearances that the organism initiates its final return into itself.

This involvement with external being, in stimulation and the process itself, is however also determined as an externality, being opposed to universality, and to that simple relationship of life to itself. This involvement itself, therefore, properly constitutes the object and the negation opposed to the subjectivity of the organism and it is this that it must overcome and digest. This inversion [Verkehrung] of view is the principle of the organism's reflection into itself. The return [Rückkehr] into itself is the negation of its externally oriented activity (§365).

The appearance of an external object that is opposed to a subject and the eventual transformation of this object into the subjectivity of the organism is itself the very negativity that is posited in opposition to the organism. This appearance is the proper difference of practical assimilation. Therefore, it is this object that must be surpassed and digested. This digestion is accomplished through a turn [Kehre] that is simultaneously
a turn away and a turn towards. The organism turns away from the appearance of externality and towards its very engagement with this appearance. This turn, however, has a doubly determined result.

On the one hand, the organism expels from itself the activity it has set in conflict with the externality of the object, and on the other hand, it has become for itself through its immediate identity with this activity and by this means has reproduced itself. It is in this way that the process outward is transformed into the first formal process of simple reproduction from itself, into the uniting of itself with itself (§365).

In turning away from its involvement with externality, the animal expels the activity that had set it in conflict with the external object. The animal expels the water and fire processes by which the external object was to be transformed. Faecal matter, therefore, is not at all undigested material, but—as one sees especially in the faeces of suckling infants—consists of “what the organism itself adds to the received material: the bile...” (§365a). This expulsion, however, is also accompanied by a return. In expelling its entanglement (its digestive fluids), the organism returns to its own activities. It returns to itself. In this way, it unites itself with itself and, in doing so, becomes reproduced from itself. The result of practical assimilation, therefore, is doubly determined as an excretion and simple self-reproduction.¹

Through the assimilation process, the individual animal reproduces itself from itself. In this act of simple reproduction, the immediacy of the individual animal is sublated. The result of this operation, then, is a mediated or “dual individual” (§366). “Linked up with itself in this way, the concept is determined as the concrete universal or genus, which enters into a relationship and a process with the singularity of subjectivity” (§366). At this point, however, the genus is not determined for itself. It is the further determination of the genus that constitutes the third and final process of animal life. The end result of the assimilation process, therefore, becomes the first moment of theGattungsprozeß which comprises, among other procedures, the sexual relationship. The consequences of this coordination opens an entire field of research, and its pursuit would most certainly need to take up residence at château Silling. However, it must not be forgotten that the final moment of assimilation was doubly determined. It engenders not only a reproduction of the organism but also an inorganic excretion. What has happened to the excremental byproduct of assimilation?

Excrement is principally composed of the animal’s own digestive fluids. It is not unassimilated material, that is, the unused or superfluous externalia. Rather, what is excreted in the process of assimilation is the animal’s own involvement with externality. “The organism expels xxexzerniert from itself the activity it has set in conflict with the externality
of the object . . .” (§365). This activity is the process of digestion, that operation by which the external object is reappropriated through mechanical seizure and transformation. It is the digestive process that is expelled and made external. Therefore, the entanglement with externality is only surpassed through a further externalization.

But what about this externalization of the entanglement with externality? What about this “second order” organic expulsion? What does it mean? What is its status? In other words, what is the significance of excrementality? Excrement reiterates the initial self-differentiating movement of the assimilation process. It is posited by the organism through an immediate expulsion, and it confronts the organism as an inorganic other. Therefore, according to the procedure just described, one would expect the animal to sublate this alterity through assimilation. Such an operation, however, would be nothing less than coprophagy, which, when taken to its logical conclusion, would constitute an infinite circulation of excreta and food akin to that described by Timaeus in the Platonic dialogue that bears his name.

Nor would there have been use of organs by the help of which he might receive his food or get rid of what he had already digested, since there was nothing which went from him or came into him, for there was nothing besides him. Of designs he was created, thus his own waste providing his own food, and all that he did or suffered taking place in and by himself (Plato 1982a, 33b-d).

In the Philosophy of Nature, however, the living organism is not coprophagie. In this case, excrement comprises a second order externalization that does not stand in any sort of dialectical relationship to the organism that had discharged it and, as a result, does not come to be assimilated through either a theoretically or practically process. In the course of the development of the “Animal Organism,” therefore, excrement constitutes an externalization that is simply thrown away. It is excreted, expelled, wasted.

The Philosophy of Nature does not think coprophagy. Excreta are not assimilated; they are wasted. However, the decisive question remains. Is this externalization a mere natural contingency that is indifferent to the movement of the concept or does it somehow deform the concept itself? On the one hand, it appears as if the animal’s wasting of its excrement is a mere contingent matter. For the other product of the assimilation process does indeed constitute the first moment of the Gattungsprozeß. The wasting of excrement, it seems, is indifferent to the determination of the individual animal as a sexual entity. On the other hand, such wasting constitutes an aberration of the method of the science itself, for, according to its logic, the dialectical advance neither loses anything nor leaves anything behind. With excrement, however, something is indeed left
behind. In the course of assimilation, excrement is left behind in the advance to the *Gattungsprosøfei*. Can this apparent deformation of the very logic of the science be accounted for as a mere contingent aberration? Can this deformation of the method which is not a specific kind or manner of cognition but the sole force of reason itself (Hegel 1986c, 551/826) be covered over and explained away? And what about such an explanation? Is it not a kind of wasting, an expulsion from science of that which deforms the very movement of the science itself?

The *Philosophy of Nature* does not think coprophagy and in doing so risks deforming the very form of science. It does not, for even a moment, entertain operations like those narrated by Duclos on the sixth day of Sodom. It will not hear of it. It does not hear of it. Duclos’s narration is addressed to other, more discriminating tastes.

Before any other audience, said that amiable girl, I might shrink at broaching the subject of the narratives wherewith this entire week we shall be occupied, but however crupulous that subject, I am too well acquainted with your tastes, Messieurs, to be in any wise apprehensive. No, I believe you’ll not be displeased; quite the contrary, I am convinced you will find my anecdotes agreeable. I ought however to advise you that you are about to hear of abominable, filthy goings on; but whose ears could be better made to appreciate them? (Sade 1966, 6.1).

2. Exorbitance

The end of the assimilation process constitutes the first moment of the *Gattungsprosøfei*. This procedure comprises the self-determination of the genus, and this occurs, in general, through its opposition to particularity. “However, because the relationship of the genus to the particular is different in kind, so we also have to distinguish between the particular processes that are the different kinds of deaths of living individuals” (Hegel 1986a, §367z). There are three different kinds of deaths, and these constitute three syllogisms by which particularity comes to be sublated. They are as follows: “The Genus and the Species” (§368), the “Sexual Relationship” (§§369-370) and “The Death of the Individual from Itself” (§§375-376) which is preceded by a rather lengthy consideration of sickness (§§371-374). These three syllogisms do not constitute moments or stages in the determination of the genus. Rather, “they fall apart and exist as various particular processes, which terminate in the various kinds of deaths suffered by living beings” (§367). Therefore, these three syllogisms constitute three separate processes that have the same result, namely, the death of the individual, closure of organic nature as a whole, and the issuing forth of spirit. Although each procedure is distinctly different, the end-result is the same. Hence, the conclusion of the *Philosophy of Nature* takes the form of a trident or (better) a three-way, forked road in which each separate avenue leads to and terminates in the same place. For this
reason, the manifested order and sequence of these sections is not itself
directly derived from the concept. The sequence, therefore, remains
rather arbitrary. This may explain why the formal arrangement of the
final sections exhibits such drastic alterations from the first edition to the
third. Not only had the sequence of the sections been altered in the third
edition but a number of substantial textual changes were made in the
course of this alteration. Because the sequence is not determined by the
movement of the concept, the three different processes should be capable
of being ordered in any fashion what so ever. Not only that, but if we are
to believe the determinations indicated here, the final subdivision of the
Philosophy of Nature should be arranged as a parallel text with three
columns rather than as a sequence of sections. Although this arrangement
is peculiar to the Philosophy of Nature, it does not necessarily deform the
formal structure of the science. It does not, that is, assuming that all three
processes do indeed conclude with the death of the animal organism and
the transition to spirit.

The following will not attempt to work through all three processes in
detail, but will be restricted to the sexual relationship [Geschlechtsverhältnis] and its particular petite mort. This relationship constitutes a process where by the individuality of the animal comes to be
sublated through the determination of its genus. “The genus is present in
the individual as a strain opposed to the inadequacy of its single actuality;
it is present as an urge to attain its self-feeling in the other of its genus,
to integrate itself through union with this other, and by means of this
mediation to bring the genus into existence and join itself together with
it” (§369).

In the sexual relationship, the genus comes forth by the animal
relating to and integrating itself with an other. This other is not inorganic
nature (as was the case in assimilation) but is itself another organism. It
is the other of the genus. This distinction constitutes sexual difference.
And it is this difference that is eventually sublated through sexual integra-
tion, the result of which will be the one, universal genus that is common
to both sexes. “Their union is the disappearance of the sexes, in which the
simple genus has come into being” (§369z). Sexual differentiation, like
all dialectical difference, therefore, will only exhibit a difference abiding
within an identity. In order to demonstrate this, Hegel undertakes a
comparative anatomical analysis of the sex organs. The purpose of this
comparison is to present the identity within difference of the male and
female genitals.3

But both sides are not merely neutral in themselves, as in chemistry.
Rather on account of the original identity of their formation, the same
type [Typus] grounds both the male and female genitals, only that in the
one or the other the one or the other part makes up the essential: in
the female this is necessarily the undifferentiated element /das
Indifference, in the male it is the sundered element [das Entzweite] of opposition (§369z).

Because the male and female constitute one universal form, their genitals are of the same type. Only one typus underlies their particular differentiation. Sexual difference, then, is not a typical, formal division. Rather, it remains a mere distinction of essential particularity abiding in the identity of one universal form. In other words, male and female genitalia exhibit the same particular structure. However, in one or the other sex one or the other part has prominence. In the female the essential part is the undifferentiated element or uterus, while in the male it is the sundered element or the penis.\(^4\)

Comparative anatomy endeavors to demonstrate this formal identity within difference by arranging a series of paired parts:

As in the male the uterus is reduced to a mere gland, so comparatively the male testicle in the female remains enclosed within the ovary, does not emerge into opposition, does not become for-itself and is not an active brain. The clitoris moreover is inactive feeling in general. In the male, on the other hand, we have active feeling, the up-swelling heart, the filling with blood of the corpora cavernosa and the meshes of the spongy tissue of the urethra; this masculine engorgement with blood corresponds to feminine discharge of blood. The reception of the uterus, as simple holding back, is sundered in the male into a productive brain and the external heart. Therefore, through this difference, the male is the active principle; but the female is the one who conceives, because she remains in her undeveloped unity (§369z).

The uterus is paired with the prostate gland, the ovaries are partner to the testes, menstruation is compared to erection, etc. “In this way, one can perfectly understand the reformation of one sex into the other” (§369z). The difference abiding within this identification is specified as follows: The male genitals are determined to be active [tätigen], emergent [heraustreten], productive [produzieren] and filled with blood [Blutefüllen]. Female genitalia, on the other hand, are designated as being inactive [untätigen], enclosed [eingeschlossen], undeveloped [unentwickelt] and expelling blood [Blutergüssen]. The predicates attributed to the female are the negative or opposite of those belonging to the male. The feminine, as the other of the male, is thought as his other. That is, she is determined in opposition to his character and then only as the negative. Her alterity is only the underside and accomplice of his positivity. This formulation of sexual difference is consistent with the history of western thought from Genesis onwards. A femininity that is otherwise than the other of masculinity, that is determined as other than the opposite and negative of the male, exceeds this understanding of sexual difference. This exorbitant alterity, this other than other that constitutes a difference beyond difference and a negativity that can no
longer be understood as the opposite and underside of patriarchal positivity, has been one of the major concerns of recent feminist theorists (cf., for example, Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, etc.). Strictly speaking, this exorbitant femininity never takes place. She is never present or presented within the self-determination of the concept, for her alterity exceeds the very movement of the concept itself. Therefore, she cannot be demonstrated, brought into appearance, or even thought. She exceeds the very possibility of all these operations. She can only be marked by a seemingly contradictory operation that interrupts and impedes usual discursive practices. Hence, she neither is, is not, nor is and is not. Indeed, to manifest her absence or speak (of) her silence requires strange contortions of language.

The exorbitant remains radically outside philosophy, and its exteriority exceeds the very thinking of the outside as an outside (cf., for example, §140). As such, the exorbitant cannot be thought, made manifest, or indicated. This absolute absence certainly does not impede the movement of the concept. Indeed, its movement has already been facilitated in and by this exclusion. Here then, the aberration does not occur as a resistance to the concept but consists in an exclusion from all possible conceptuality. Therefore, at this stage, that is, within the course of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, the exorbitance of the feminine has the status of a mere suspicion. Because this monstrous alterity would be absolutely absent from the movement of the concept, her exclusion cannot be demonstrated or argued in accordance with philosophically recognized operations or scientifically sanctioned logic. Our suspicions concerning this matter, however, can be confirmed by considering the sexually exclusive character of the science as a whole.

The sexual relationship is not limited to a subsection of the animal organism. It is also manifest in the macrostructure of the encyclopedic system. From the beginning of the Philosophy of Nature, the interactions of spirit [der Geist] and nature [die Natur] are expressed in terms of a sexual relationship. “Spirit has the certainty which Adam had when he beheld Eve: ‘This is flesh of my flesh, this is bone of my bone.’ Nature is, so to speak, the bride espoused to spirit” (§246z). Nature is produced from the same flesh and bone as that of spirit and is eventually returned to spirit through matrimonial sublation. Because spirit and nature essentially possess the same corporeal type, their sexual differentiation should not impede their final integration. Even so, feminine nature is not yet an appropriate spouse for spirit. Her sex must be altered before she and spirit can consummate their marriage. “When we see her [Nature’s] processes and transmutations, we want to grasp her simple essence, urging this Proteus to cease his transformations and to show himself to us and speak-out, not so that he merely holds before us multiple, always new forms, but
rather so that what he is can be brought to consciousness in a simpler way, in language” (§244z).

The integration of nature and spirit entails a turning. Spirit must turn away from the complexities of observing nature and toward the simplicity of appropriating her in language [logos]. Such a trope imitates the protophilosophic gesture described as the Socratic second sailing (cf. Plato, 1962b, 99e). But this turn toward the logos is also a turn of sexuality. The feminine noun is turned into a masculine one; die Natur is transformed into der Proteus. Nature, then, is submitted to an alteration of gender. Before her husband, she must, as he commands, cacher le con. This exchange operation had been prescribed from the very beginning of the Philosophy of Nature. Therefore, the proper other of spirit, his appropriate betrothed, must exhibit the same gender. The feminine remains absolutely outside of this predetermined homosexual process. She constitutes an exorbitant difference that maintains no proper place within the science. Science is gay; the system is queer.

The second part of the Encyclopedia was announced as a turn towards logos that is also a turn towards masculinity. The remarks positioned here have hardly begun to probe the consequences of this phallogocentrism. This trope, however, has a long and complicated history. It is coextensive, at least, with the entire history of philosophy. Therefore, the Hegelian system, as a kind of completion of the philosophical project, occupies a crucial position within this history, and its analysis will constitute a unique moment in the further examination.5

3. Waste II—Death

The result of the sexual relationship is the sublation of sexual difference and the production of the one, universal genus that does not admit of sexual differentiation. In its natural aspect, however, the result of the sexual relationship is not the sexless genus but an entity that is “itself an immediate singular, which has the determination of developing itself into the same natural individuality, the same difference and transitoriness” (§370). The product of the sexual relationship, when considered naturally, is neither universal nor sexless. Rather, it repeats the particular determinations of the process from which it arose. Like its parents, the progeny is an immediate singularity and is therefore differentiated sexually.

“This process of propagation hereby results in the bad infinite [schlechte Unendlichkeit] of the progress.” (§370). The bad infinite is an endless repetition of a given process. This ἄπαρσις, however, “does not attain to the production of the genus” (§381z). The genus achieves an existence not in the “endless iteration” of the bad infinite but through the death of the individuals. “The genus preserves itself only through the
decline \textit{[Untergang]} of the individuals, which fulfill their determination in the process of generation, and in so far as they have no higher determination, pass on to death" (§370). It is in the death of the individual animal that the universal genus comes forth, and it is in the dying of the animal that nature itself comes to a close. For this reason, we must now consider the death of the animal which has been determined to be not only the eventual result of the sexual relationship but that of all three processes grouped under the \textit{Gattungsprozeß}. The place of this consideration is the last section of the \textit{Philosophy of Nature} (§376).

In the \textit{Gattungsprozeß}, the individual animal was not adequate to its universality. In general, the goal of each separate \textit{Gattungsprozeß} was "the sublation of the \textit{formal opposition} between the \textit{immediate} singularity and \textit{universality} of individuality" (§376). The result of this is now determined to be twofold. Naturally, the sublation of the opposition within the individual animal between its singularity and universality constitutes the death of the animal. "This is only on one side, and indeed the abstract side, the \textit{death of naturalness}" (§376). Ideally, however, this sublation constitutes the determination of the concept and the surpassing of externality in nature. "Through the demonstrated sublation of the \textit{immediacy} of its reality it [the concept] has gone together with itself. The last \textit{being-outside-itself} of nature is sublated, and the concept that is merely the \textit{in-itself} has become \textit{for itself}" (§376). This is the beginning of spirit. Nature, then, ends with the death of the individual animal which, at the level of nature, can be nothing more than an empty, destructive negation. This natural death, however, constitutes at the same time the initial moments of spirit.

Spirit precedes out of the end of nature and in so doing constitutes the next sphere of the science, the \textit{Philosophy of Spirit}. It is in this third and final division of the science that spirit comes to determine itself in and for itself as absolute spirit. Therefore, the end or death of nature constitutes the transition to the \textit{Philosophy of Spirit}. Spirit, however, is not the exclusive product of the natural process. The death of nature also produces something else. This other product is initially identified in the first sentence of the \textit{Zusatz} to §376. "Superseding this death of nature, proceeding from this \textit{dead husk}, there rises the finer nature of spirit" (§376z, emphasis added). The difference between the determination of the end of nature as articulated in the main section and that offered in its \textit{Zusatz} appears to be negligible. There is, however, a distinct and important difference. According to the main section, spirit proceeds from the death of nature. This death constitutes the abstract and empty result of the sublation of the individual. This result appears to be terminal. That is, it implies that there is no further natural byproduct. According to the \textit{Zusatz}, however, spirit arises not from the \textit{death of nature} but from the natural byproduct of this operation, namely, the corpse. In this way, spirit
is determined as proceeding from out of the corpse of nature. The main section obscures the fact that in nature death always results in a corpse. Nature, then, has two results, spirit and the dead husk. It is the former that constitutes the transition to the next phase of the science. But what of the latter? What of the corpse or the empty husk of nature? What is its status and significance?

In the course of the Philosophy of Nature, the idea comes to sublate its externality or being-outside-of-itself and, in connecting up with itself in this way, is in and for itself. This sublation of natural externality not only produces the first moment of spirit but also has the result of a further natural determination, the corpse. The corpse is no longer an animate entity but remains a mere inorganic, dead thing. It, therefore, constitutes something like the excrement of nature. This "excrement" does not impede the movement of the concept. Spirit, it seems, rises from the corpse of nature without any resistance. However, the dialectical advance from the Philosophy of Nature to the Philosophy of Spirit remains unencumbered precisely because the corpse of nature has not been taken into account. The trace of this deficiency is manifest by its absence from the main part of §376. And this absence has supervened only by comparing the main section to its Zusatz. What is the meaning of this deficiency? Does it not constitute a forgetting or wasting of the corpse? And does this not, in turn, constitute an aberration of the very method of the science which prides itself on the fact that by its dialectical advance it does not either lose anything or leave anything behind?

The Philosophy of Nature does not consider or account for the corpse of nature. It appears to have wasted the empty husk. In doing so, the proper form of philosophical reasoning risks deformation. This conclusion can be confirmed through a consideration of the figure of the Phoenix which is employed in the latter part of the Zusatz to §376. It is the mythical Phoenix that illustrates the sublation of natural differentiation and the production of spiritual unity. Indeed, it is this rare bird that supplied the metaphor by which the young Hegel poeticized (for the sake of courting his fiancée) the sublation of natural difference as achieved within the spiritual unity of marriage (Hegel 1811, #178).

Sieh den Altar hier auf Bergeshühen,  
Auf dem Phönix in der Flamme stirbt  
Um in ew'ger Jugend aufzugehen,  
Die ihm seine Asche nur erwehrt.

Auf sich war gekehrt sein Sinnen,  
Hatte sich zu eigen es gespart,  
Nun soll seines Daseins Punkt zerriessen,  
Und der Schmerz des Opfers ward ihm hart

See the altar here atop mountains,  
On which Phoenix dies in flames,  
In order to arise in eternal youth,  
That is only gained from its ashes.

On itself had been turned its brooding,  
Had preserved itself as its own,  
Now the point of its existence should vanish,  
And the pain of the sacrifice weighs upon it.
Aber fühlend ein unstrechlich Streben,  
Treibt ihn über sich hinaus;  
Mag die irdische Natur erbeben,  
Führt er es in Flammen aus.

But feeling an immortal striving,  
Drives it out over itself;  
May the earthly nature tremble,  
It carries it out in flames.

Fallt so, enge Binden, die uns scheiden,  
Nur ein Opfer ist des Herzens Lauf;  
Mich zu Dir, zu mir Dich zu erweiten,  
Geh’ in Feuer, was uns vereinzelt, auf!

Fall away narrow band that divides us,  
Only sacrifice is the heart’s course,  
To expand myself to you, as you to me,  
Let what isolates us go up in flames!

Denn das Leben ist nur Wechsellieben,  
Das die Lieb in Liebe schafft;  
Der verwandten Seele hingeben,  
Tut das Herz sich auf in seiner Kraft.

For life is only exchange of life,  
That creates love in love;  
The kindred souls devoted,  
Opens the heart itself in its power.

Tritt der Geist auf freie Bergeshöhen,  
Er behält vom Eignen nichts zurück;  
Leb’ ich, saich in Dir, Du Dich in mir zu sehen,  
So genießt wir der Himmel Glück.

Steps the spirit upon free mountain-top,  
It holds back nothing of its own;  
Living to see myself in you and you yourself in me,  
We enjoy heavenly bliss.

According to the penultimate paragraph in the Zusatz to §376, “the purpose of nature is to kill itself and to break through its ring of immediacy and sensibility, to burn itself [sich verbrennen] like the Phoenix, in order to step forth out of this externality, rejuvenated as Spirit” (Hegel 1986a, §376z). In this way, the transition from nature to spirit is effected by fire. What is fire? This question entails a brief regression to the second part of the Philosophy of Nature, specifically the section that concerns the physical elements. Here, fire is presented as one element of opposition. However, it is not an original, elemental ordeal. Rather, it is the overcoming of posited difference. “It [fire] is not the negativity of another, but rather the negation of the negative which results in universality and sameness” (§283z). Fire then is the sublation of difference. Specifically, it is a kind of digestion, that is, “a consumption [Verzehren] of another that simultaneously consumes itself, and so goes over into neutrality” (§283). Like animal digestion, fire is the consumption of an alterity that, at the same time, consumes its own consumptive activity. Furthermore, the result of this consumption, like that of the organic assimilation process, is also doubly determined. On the one hand, it produces a flame or flash of light. It is this light that will constitute physical selfhood. On the other hand, that which is consumed passes over into a neutrality. “The other aspect of this process is that the determinate, differentiated and individualized particularity that is present in all concrete being is reduced to the unity and indeterminateness of neutrality” (§283z). The neutrality that accompanies elemental fire is water.

Nature ends in a conflagration. This self-burning, like all inciner-
tions, will have a doubly determined result. The Zusatz to §376, however, only specifies one product—the firelight of spirit. It does not account for the abstract neutrality that should, at least conceptually, accompany all burnings. This other result can be ascertained by recalling briefly the mythology to which this note refers. According to the story of the Phoenix, the fledgling emerges from the ashes of its parent. For this reason, it is said that the Phoenix arises from out of its ashes. Therefore, the other, unnamed result of the consumptive burning of nature are its ashes.

What about this other unnamed product? What of ashes? What is the status and significance of ash? In the mythic narrative, the fledgling does not take its ashes into account. It leaves them behind on the mountain top. Or, if it does initially consider its ashes, as is the case in one variant form of the story, it only does so in order to deposit them elsewhere. In either narrative form, the ashes of the parent are left behind by the rejuvenated bird. The Philosophy of Nature does not even take this aspect of the narrative into account. Ashes remain absent from its consideration. The Philosophy of Nature, therefore, does not account for its ashes. Practically speaking, it too leaves them behind. Spirit is identified with the figure of the Phoenix and not with ashen Artemisia.

The Philosophy of Nature does not think cinders. The ashes are left out of account in the advance into Spirit. They are abandon on the threshold. Such waste constitutes an aberration of the method of the science which supposedly does not lose anything or leave anything behind. Can this deformation of the very logic of the science be accounted for as a mere natural contingency? Does this provision even apply at the end of the Philosophy of Nature? Can this aberration of the method, which is not a specific kind or manner of cognition but the sole force of reason itself, be covered over and explained away? And what about such an explanation? Is it not a kind of superlative wasting, an expulsion from the science of that which deforms the very movement of the concept itself?

Conclusion

Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature makes provisions for two kinds of monsters. On the one hand, it accounts for monstrous deviations as necessary components of the richness of nature itself. Although these monsters exceed derivation from the concept directly, they do not resist its movement and therefore are nothing more than contingent particularities. Such monsters do not impede the demonstration of the science. On the other hand, the Philosophy of Nature is also afflicted by a kind of deviation that exceeds this determination of acceptable and accountable monsters. These second-order monsters resist the movement of the concept insofar as they constitute aberrations that deform the very method of rationality. These scary monsters and super freaks occur as deforma-
tions of the animating negativity of science itself. One consists in an exorbitant difference. It comprises an alterity that is not posited in the first negation and therefore remains otherwise than being the other of another. The second occurs as waste which is a negation of negation in which something is lost and/or left behind in the course of the dialectical advance. Because these two monstrosities deviate from the very method of the science, they cannot be indicated or demonstrated according to its logic. For this reason, one cannot say that the previous has demonstrated or proved the existence of these monsters. Rather, such deviations only supervene in a fashion that itself is considered monstrous in comparison to philosophical demonstration and scientific proof. For this reason, they have come forth in moments of suspicion or probability, and their articulations have been anything but demonstrative. They are, therefore, demonstrated rather than demonstrated.

Monsters, therefore, share more than the word's root with the verb "to demonstrate." Monsters signify. And what they signify is precisely the deterioration and demise of philosophical demonstration in general. What they mark are the points at which the process of rational self-presentation degenerates and becomes deformed. As such, they signal the places in which the nature of philosophy (and the Philosophy of Nature) opens itself to exorbitant possibilities that can never be made manifest, comprehended or controlled. The meaning of these deformations is necessarily twofold. On the one hand, they signal the irretrievable deterioration of a form of reasoning that has come to govern and dominate western thought. In this case, the monstrous is experienced as nothing less than terrifying, gloomy and depressing. On the other hand, these monsters also mark the threshold of new and unheard of possibilities. "They are not at all sad and gloomy but rather like a new and scarcely describable kind of light, happiness, relief, exhilaration, encouragement, dawn" (Nietzsche, 1974, §343).

1 In the Remark /Anmerkung/ to §365, Hegel indicates that the evidence derived from the empirical observation of animal digestion does in fact conform to the presentation of the concept. This indication is secured through reference to the experiments performed by L. Spallanzani as reported in his Dissertazioni di fisica animale e vegetabile (Modena, 1780) and Expériences sur les digestion de l'homme et de différentes espèces d'animaux (Geneva, 1783).

2 This is the structure and order of the Gattungssprozeß as it occurs in the third edition of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). The first and second editions employ a different arrangement.

4 I am grateful to David Farrell Krell for directing my attention to this passage in his article “Pitch: Genitality and Excrementality From Hegel to Crazy Jane” in Boundary 2: A Journal of Postmodern Literature and Culture, 12, no. 2 (Winter 1984), pp. 113-141.


7 Cf. Ovid’s Metamorphoses, lines 391-410. Here, the juvenile Phoenix gathers up the remains of its parent only to deposit them on the threshold of the city of the Sun [Heliopolis].

8 The wife of Mausolus who ingested the ashes of her dead spouse.

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