




the machine question

ethics, alterity & technology


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ethics of exclusion









If any such machine had the organs and outward shape of a monkey or of some other animal that lacks reason, we should have no means of knowing that they did not possess entirely the same nature as these animals (Descartes, 1637, p. 56).



That man has reason does not in the least raise him in worth above mere animality if reason only serves the purpose which, among animals, are taken care of by instinct...But he has reason for yet a higher purpose, namely, to consider also what is in itself good or evil, which pure and sensuously disinterested reason alone can judge (Kant, 1788, p. 108)





It was in 1903 when analytic philosophy's patron saint, George Edward Moore, published his classic, *Principia Ethica*. You can read every word in it. You can read between every line of it. Look where you will, you will not find the slightest hint of attention to 'the animal question.' Natural and non-natural properties, yes. Definitions and analyses, yes. The open-question argument and the method of isolation, yes. But so much as a word about non-human animals? No. Serious moral philosophy, of the analytic variety, back then did not traffic with such ideas (Regan, 1999, p. xii).



In thematizing response solely in terms of the human face and voice, it would seem that Levinas leaves untouched the oldest and perhaps most sinister unexamined privilege of the same: *anthropos*, and only *anthropos*, has *logos*; and as such, *anthropos* responds not to the barbarous or the inanimate, but only to those who qualify for the privilege of 'humanity,' only those deemed to possess a face, only to those recognized to be living in the *logos*" (Nealon, 1998, p. 71).

In 1971, three Oxford philosophers—Roslind and Stanley Bodlovitch, and John Harris—published *Animals, Men and Morals*. The volume marked the first time philosophers had collaborated to craft a book that dealt with the moral status of nonhuman animals (Regan, 1999, p. xi).





1) The crisis of humanism...brought on, in no small part, first by structuralism and then post-structuralism and its interrogation of the figure of the human as the constitutive (rather than technically, materially, and discursively constituted) stuff of history and the social (Wolfe, 2003, p. x-xi).

2) A veritable explosion of work in areas such as cognitive ethology and field ecology has called into question our ability to use the old saws of anthropocentrism (language, tool use, the inheritance of cultural behaviors, and so on) to separate ourselves once and for all from the animals, as experiments in language and cognition with great apes and marine mammals, and field studies of extremely complex social and cultural behaviors in wild animals such as apes, wolves, and elephants, have more or less permanently eroded the tidy divisions between human and nonhuman (Wolfe, 2003, p. xi).

You can read every word in it. You can read between every line of it. Look where you will, you will not find the slightest hint of attention to “the machine question.”

We have never considered ourselves to have moral duties to our machines (Hall, 2002, p. 2)

Full paper available at:
<http://www.gunkelweb.com/papers.html>

